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A SIAMESE PENAL CODE.
The Siamese Government has appointed a High Commission to
report on a draft of a penal code prepared sometime since by Judge
Tokichi Masao of the Court of Appeals (Y. L. S., D.C.L. 1897).
Judge Masao, who is also Legal Adviser to the Government, is
one of the Commission. An English translation of the draft
code has been published at Bangkok.
BREACH OF MARRIAGE PROMISE-INCURABLE TUBERCULOSIS AS A
DEFENSE.
The decision of the Supreme Court of Washington, in Grover
v. Zoak, 87 Pac. 638, seems to present a striking instance of the
encroachment of the judiciary upon the powers of the legis-
lative branch of government. In that case it was held, on
grounds of public policy, that a man was not liable for breach of
a marriage promise when the woman was suffering from incur-
able pulmonary tuberculosis although he knew, at the time of
the engagement, that she had the disease.
While the cause of action for breach of promise of mar-
riage has, under conditions of American life, fallen into much
discredit, yet such a right of recovery should be abolished,
in any particular instance or upon the existence of any special
circumstance, by legislation and not by judicial subterfuge.
Broad questions of public policy and distinct progressive steps
in public policy are matters that fall more properly within the
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cognizance of a legislature than of the courts. It is for the
legislature to determine what laws are required to protect and
secure the public health, comfort, and safety; its determination,
of course, subject to review by the courts where constitutional
rights are involved. In reJacobs, 98 N. Y. 98. In matters which
are committed to the legislature, the courts have no jurisdiction.
Bradshaw v. City of Omaha, i Neb. i6. The courts cannot
usurp the powers of the legislature by decisions which in effect
amount to enactment of laws and the exercise of legislative
powers. State v. Blasdell, 4 Nev. 241.
Therefore, while the present decision seems open to objec-
tions because not strictly and properly within the powers of thejudiciary, yet it may be justified on account of the fact that it
is aided by certain legislation of the State of Washington recog-
nizing the infectious nature of tuberculosis and providing
elaborate and systematic precautions against the spread of the
disease.
The court cites many cases, and the principle of them is well
established, that a party to a marriage contract may break it
upon discovering the existence of a disease that would render
the marriage relation improper or dangerous, but in the prin-
cipal case this doctrine is extended to hold that the contract
may be abandoned although the existence of a incurable disease
necessarily inimical to marital welfare was known at the time
when it was made.
The following language from the opinion of the Washington
court, seems, in view of the facts of the case as disclosed by
the record, to be reasonable and sound, although it is clear that
.the doctrine of the case might easily be carried to extreme
length:
"Counsel for respondent cite us to cases where a man, promis-
ing to marry a woman whom he knew to have been formerly
unchaste, was held to be bound by such promise. Such a case
and this are not analagous. There the man by his promise over-
looks the former shortcomings of the woman, and it is a matter
concerning him only. She would have the ability to, and pre-
sumably would, reform and become a good wife and worthy
mother. This is to the advantage of society and not inconsistent
with sound public policy, and the law should interpose no
hindrance thereto. But a consumptive woman is physically in-
capable of becoming a healthful companion or the mother of
healthy issue. It is not a condition that she voluntarily created
or can change at will. The evils to follow her marriage could
not be confined to herself and husband, but must of necessity
concern and injuriously effect others. The nature and natural
consequences of a contract of marriage are such that the state is
of necessity a third party to and interested in every such agree-
ment. Its interests forbid the enforcement of such a contract
between parties physically incapable of making the married
state beneficial to themselves or society. We are not disposed
to take into consideration any matters personal only to the ap-
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pellant. If he knew of the nature of respondent's ailment when
he agreed to make her his wife, notwithstanding the same, he
ought not to escape responsibility by reason of any inconvenience
affecting only himself. But the interests of community and
state step in, and, with the dictates of humanity, demand that
no human compact shall be upheld that has for one of its prin-
cipal objects the bringing into the world of helpless, hopeless,
plague-cursed, innocent babes. We can sanction the breaking of
a promise and relieve from the terms of a deliberate agreement
only when the alternative involves results more deplorable.
Had these parties married it is inconceivable that any of the im-
portant ends of marriage could have been attained. It is
morally certain that sickness, grief and sorrow must have been
the sequence of such a union. These considerations, with the
possibility and probability of issue, afflicted with this terrible
malady, constrain us to hold that the marriage agreement was
not binding-that it was the privilege of either party to with-
draw therefrom."
INJURIES RECEIVED BY PERSONS ON PUBLIC SCHOOL PREMISES
A general discussion as to who is liable in the case of injuries
received upon public school property, is suggested by the case
of Alfred Wahrman v. The Board of Education of the City of New
York, recently decided by the Court of Appeals. The Statutes
of New York authorizing the control of the Department of Pub-
lic Instruction have been frequently brought before the courts
for interpretation in cases involving the liability of various
officers for injuries received by persons attending the schools.
Many such actions have been brought against the city corpora-
tion, in which cases it has been held that the rule of respondeat
superior does not apply to make the city liable for the negligent
acts of the agents and servants of the department as for example
that of Public Charities and Corrections, Maxmilian v. The Mayor,
62 N. Y. i6o; and the Board of Education, Terry v. The Mayor,
8 Bosw. 504. Chap. 386 Laws of i851, 301 Laws of 1853, xoi
Laws of 1854, 574 Laws of 1871, 112 Laws of 1873 have been
construed as vesting in the "Board of Education" the general
control and care of school buildings and property "for the pur-
poses of public education," while the especial care and safe keep-
ing of such buildings in the respective wards is committed to the
"ward trustees," who are also authorized to make repairs.
Donovan v. Board of Education, 85 N. Y. 117, points out that,
for the negligent acts of the ward trustees or their agents, the
Board of Education is not liable as their functions are distinct.Donovan v. McAlpin, 85 N. Y. 185, lays down a rule exempting
the "ward trustee" from liability for the injuries caused by the
negligence of a janitor or workman employed by him on a school
building. The principle of this exemption seems to have been
the general rule that public officers are not liable personally for
the malfeasance or misfeasance of their employees or agents.
Story, Agency, 32z. And the only remedy the injured person has,
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where the public officer is without compensation and derives no
benefit from the acts of the negligent agent, is against the
immediate wrong-doer. Jones v. Bird, 5 B. and Ald. 837. Of
course the public or administrative character of a person or body
affords no immunity against the consequences of its own neg-
ligence. Story, Agency, §320. And it was with this doctrine in
mind that the Court of Appeals decided the present case holding
the Board of Education liable. The plaintiff, a pupil in the
public schools, had been injured by the falling of the ceiling in
the school-room while he was occupying the seat assigned him.
The holding points out that it was the duty of the "trustees" or
other officers to repair this ceiling and that '' the board" is in no
way chargeable for the negligence of the "trustees" but that it
is liable for its own negligence in this case for failing to close the
room until the repairs should have been made.
TRADE NAMES.
The doctrine of unfair trade, which has of late years been so
greatly developed, and its application or lack of application to a
copyright, were lately discussed in the case of Ogilvie v. G. &
C Merriam Co., 148 Fed. Rep. 858. There it was decided that
the G. & C. Merriam Co. at the expiration of their copyright
did not have a right to the exclusive use of the name "Webster"
in the title of dictionaries of the English language and that the
printing of the publisher's name (George W. Ogilvie) on the
back or cover and title page was enough to distinguish the dic-
tionaries published by him from those of the original publishers
(G. & C. Merriam Co.) who had been owners of the copyright
during its life.
The contention was that, in as much as the G. & C. Merriam
Co. had had a copyright, and, that during the running of that
copyright, had established a reputation for "Webster's" dic-
tionaries, which were published only by said company, they
should be protected in the reputation thus acquired by having
the sole right to the use of the word "Webster" in that connec-
tion, even after the expiration of the copyright. This claim
Colt, Circuit Judge, disposed of by saying that to give the public
"the right to publish the book, and not the incidental right to
use the name by which it is known, is in effect to destroy the
public right, and to perpetuate the monopoly." This is but in
accord with the opinion of Mr. Justice Miller in Merriam v. Hol-
loway Pub. CO, 43 Fed, Rep. 450, when he says, in effect, that a
man has no right to continue his monopoly under the pretence
that it is protected by a trade-mark, trade-name, or anything of
that sort.
Indeed, the present case cannot be differentiated irom the
patent cases, such as the Singer Manufacturing Co. v. June A4lan-
ufacturing Co., 163 U. S. 169, and i'airbanks '. Jacobus, 14
Blatchford 337. The doctrine laid down, in such cases, is, that,
on the expiration of a patent the right to make the patented
article and to use the generic name passed to the public with the
dedication resulting from the expiration of the patent.
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In Linoleum Mfg. Co. v. Maine, 7 Ch. Div. 834, the same
doctrine was applied but Fry, J., said (p. 837):
"If I found they were attempting to use that name (Lino-
leum) in connection with other parts of the trade-mark, so as to
make it appear that the oxidized oil made by the defendants was
made by the plaintiffs, of course the case would be entirely dif-
ferent."
As early as 1783, there are dicta regarding the doctrine of
unfair trade, though that term was then unknown. In the case
of Singleton v. Bolton, 3 Douglas 293, decided in that year, it was
said that if a defendant sold an article of his own under the
plaintiff's name and mark, that would be fraud for which an ac-
tion would lie. And, later in 1824, this principle was restated
with the qualification that the goods so marked must be sold as
those manufactured by the plaintiff, to give him a right of ac-
tion. Sykes v. Sykes, 5 D. & R. 292.
From that time to the present day the doctrine of unfair
competition, though in various disguises, has been the object of
ever increasing application until, at this time, it occupies a
prominent place in the law. Stated in brief, and in its most
comprehensive form, it is that no man has a right to pass off his
goods upon the public as and for the goods of another, and there-
by work a fraud upon both the public and his rival in trade.
This principle is broader than the rules applicable to strict,
technical trade-marks, but it is not something separate and apart
from trade-mark law. Rather it may be said, it lies at the very
foundation of trade-mark law, and covers besides a large field to
which some of the technical trade-mark rules do not extend.
Independently of the existence of any technical trade-marks,
no manufacturer or vendor will be permitted to so dress up his
goods, by the use of names, marks, letters, labels or wrappers, or
by the adoption of any style, form or color of packages, or by the
combination of any or all of these indicia, as to cause purchasers
to be deceived into buying his goods as and for the goods of
another. McLean v. Fleming, 96 U. S. 245; Lawrence Manu-
facturing Co. v. Tennessee Manufacturing Co., 138 U. S. 537.
So in the case of Genesee Salt Co v. Burnap, 20 C. C. A. 27, it
was held that a manufacturer of salt in the Genesee valley will
not be enjoined from using the word Genesee in connection there-
with, but he will be restrained from using it in any color, style
or form of letters, or in combination with other words, so as to'
imitate a combination previously used by another maker of salt
in the same locality.
So Mr. Justice Brown in Coats v. Merrick Thread Co. 149
U. S. 562, says that irrespective of any question of trade-marks,
"rival manufacturers have no right, by imitative devices, to be-
guile the public into buying their wares under the impression
that they are buying those of their rivals."
In the case in question the above principles were fully recog-
nized and the court held that Ogilvie had done all that the law
required to distinguish his dictionaries from those of the Merriams.
S27"
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Naturally, it is a question of fact in each particular case, whether
or not one manufacturer has or has not distinguished his goods
from those of a rival manufacturer, where the same name is used
describing both. The great trend of recent decisions is emphat-
ically to broaden the doctrine of unfair competition and protect
those injured. But, where the goods are distinguished, in one
way or another, in such manner as the court thinks proper and
fair, it will not interfere though the complainant is somewhat
injured.
